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In recent years, numbers of refugees 
and migrants have reached crisis levels 
as the causes of flight have multiplied: 
wars, infringements of civil liberties, 
economic problems, environmental 
catastrophes, and increasing popula- 
tion pressures, to name a few. What- 
wer the cause of flight, the hosting of 
large influxes of refugees by a country 
of first asylum raises deep-rooted po- 
litical and economical issues related to 
the obligations and the capacities of 
poor asylum countries. This paper at- 
tempts to examine some of the issues 
that emerge as both positive and nega- 
tive impacts in a host country based on 
the experience of Malawi-a country 
that has managed to host nearly a mil- 
lion Mozambican refugees over the 
past six years or so. 
The refugee phenomenon is an 
enormous international problem. 
Since the end of the second world war, 
the world has never seen a single day 
of peace. Wars, human rights viola- 
tions, civil conflicts, tribal and reli- 
gious repression, frontier disputes, 
interstate conflicts, and economic cri- 
ses, to name a few, are viewed as some 
of the causes of flight from homeland 
(Meier-Braun 1992). The International 
Labour Organisation estimates that, 
worldwide, more than 100 million in- 
dividuals have left their native land 
and now earn a living in a foreign 
country. About 35 million Africans no 
longer live in the country of their birth. 
The Context of the Reficgees in Malawi 
Refugees from Mozambique have 
been entering Malawi since 1985, how- 
ever, the main influx started in 1986. In 
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early 1988 the refugee flow averaged 
20,000 a month. To date, the refugee 
population is estimated at almost one 
million. The vast majority of the refu- 
gees live in the densely populated 
southern regionin Malawi. Twelve out 
of the twenty-four districts of Malawi 
host refugees, either in camps or self- 
settled areas. Table 1 shows the popu- 
lation of refugees in Malawi, and 
represents 12 percent of the popula- 
tion of the whole country. 
Refugee assistance is administered 
as a collaborative effort between the 
Government of Malawi (GOM), vari- 
ous nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) and the UNHCR-United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refu- 
gees. In brief, Malawi has adopted a 
policy of integrating the administra- 
tion of humanitarian assistance into 
existing government ministries, rather 
than creating a parallel bureaucratic 
structure which would compete for re- 
sources and duplicate government ac- 
tivities. At the camp or settlement 
level, there exists an infonnal structure 
for refugee representation alongside 
the formal government structure. The 
ensuing superstructure is complex and 
its modus operandi is the dynamic inter- 
action betkeen the fo&al and infor- 
mal administrative structures. An 
elaborate procedure exists, from re- 
ception, registration and allocation of 
plots, to the distribution of relief, prob- 
lem management and the involvement 
of refugees in various income-generat- 
ing activities. 
Positive Economic and Political 
Impacts 
In any discussion of refugee-related 
impacts on host countries, one expects 
both positive and negative aspects. 
Four positive impacts will be dis- 
cussed here: employment creation, ac- 
crual of benefits to the local 
population, the stimulation of local 
commerce and an improved interna- 
tional image. 
Creation of Employment 
Creation of employment opportuni- 
ties for the Malawian nationals amid 
alarming unemployment figures is a 
significant outcome of humanitarian 
assistance. At the national level, we are 
referring to the many temporary em- 
ployees recruited to staff our over- 
stretched national bureaucracy to 
reach the refugee population. Local 
Malawians are hired as medical assis- 
tants, camp administrators, relief ad- 
ministrators, watchmen, project 
supervisors, extension staff, drivers, 
etc. In a study conducted by the writer 
on organization and management of 
the refugee regime in Malawi, it was 
estimated that over 600 individuals 
were employed full time by the relief 
program in Nsanje district alone 
(Dzimbiri 1992). 
Involvement of nationals in govern- 
ment ministries and non-government 
organizations, not only provides di- 
rect economic benefits, it is also condu- 
cive to developing human resources 
and strengthening the national and 
local capacity to administer relief pro- 
grams and respond to national crises. 
Furthermore, employment benefits 
need to be looked at from the perspec- 
tive of the employer. In areas where 
there have traditionally been seasonal 
shortages of casual labour, the influx 
of refugees has created a cheap and 
accessible labour force for both the 
smallholder and estate agricultural 
sectors, although this is thought to de- 
press local wages as a result (Long et 
al. 1990). 
Accrual of Benefits 
NGOs provide many relief inputs and 
services such as schools, boreholes, 
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health clinics, income generation 
projects, etc. While initially targeted 
toward the refugees, the present policy 
of most of these organizations is to in- 
corporate a significant number of 
Malawians as beneficiaries of various 
services and income generating activi- 
ties (Machika 1992; Dzimbiri 1992). As 
a result, local people have benefited 
from clean drinking water from new 
boreholes and expanded health serv- 
ices from new clinics built in the refu- 
gee areas. 
Stimulation of Local Commerce 
The influx of huge numbers of people 
concentrated within small areas of 
land has the effect of stimulating local 
demand for consumable and non-con- 
sumable items. Within and around set- 
tlement areas and camps, small 
businesses are thriving. These include 
restaurants, groceries, shops and tea 
rooms. Also, there are increased sales 
of fish, secondhand clothing, 
handicrafts, and traditional herbs and 
medicines. Services such as tailoring, 
and bicycle and shoe repair are also 
examples of expanding small enter- 
prise. A study by Long et al. (1990) 
confirmed an increase in the volume of 
trade in Nsanje district, with a conse- 
quent increase in market tickets from 
15,349 in 1987/88, to 36,604in 1989/90. 
In addition, there is a tendency among 
refugees to market some of their relief 
items such as oil, flour, pulses and 
blankets at very low prices to the local 
population. Finally, the services of lo- 
cal transporters have been in high de- 
mand to deliver food and non-food 
items from the main warehouses to 
refugee sites. 
Improved International Image 
The hosting of one million refugees by 
a small developing country has earned 
Malawi an international reputation as 
a generous and hospitable host. 
Among others, the UN High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, has 
publicly commended the generosity of 
the Malawian people and government 
in hosting the refugees. 
Apart from the national political 
implications of this image raising, 
there are increased opportunities to 
access international assistance. The re- 
cent unfreezing of development aid 
funds from the EC is due in part to this 
positive international image. Despite 
persistent criticism of Malawi's human 
rights record, its reputation as a host 
for more than one million refugees can- 
not be wished away. 
Having briefly discussed one side of 
the refugee-host coin, the positive im- 
pacts, we can now turn our attention to 
Table 1: Distribution of Mozambican Refugees in Malawi 
District 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993* 
Nsanje 214,298 259,981 276,556 291,769 291,518 307,137 
Chikwawa 25,827 49,136 68,336 87,269 88,188 79,050 
Mulanje 35,180 46,968 47,493 51,792 51,054 54,938 
Mangochi 26,399 34,700 38,918 44,965 44,516 38,419 
Thyolo 0 22,000 34,305 40,462 40,033 16,998 
Mwanza 20,323 35,139 48,652 83,167 93,817 90,492 
Machinga 13,985 17,753 22,873 27,303 27,497 - 
Ntcheu 132,491 152,102 160,374 138,739 137,062 132,176 
Dedza 113,000 160,141 174,544 153,059 155,303 138,137 
Lilongwe 20,327 31,228 35,576 38,499 38,636 26,568 
Mchinji 4,400 9,858 16,563 20,251 18,668 18,612 
Nkhata Bay 0 2,997 2,535 5,267 4,463 2,940 
Total 606,230 822,003 926,725 982,542 990,755 905,467 
Source: Malawi Government, 1992 
1993 figures up to August 7: Source FARRU/WFP/UNHCR Malawi 
the negative aspects of hosting a large 
refugee population. 
Negative Socioeconomic and 
Political Impacts 
Under this subject we will confine our- 
selves to a discussion of environmen- 
tal damage, the strain on resources, 
strained Malawi-Mozambique rela- 
tions, decreasing national security, the 
loss of national autonomy and the di- 
lemma of assisting refugees while 
ignoring local, disadvantaged 
Malawians. 
Environmental Damage 
The environmental damage caused by 
huge numbers of refugees in Malawi in 
relation to land, roads and deforesta- 
tion has been extensively documented 
by USAID/Malawi (Long at el. 1990), 
and need not be repeated here. Briefly, 
a lot of arable land has been surren- 
dered by the local population for refu- 
gee camps or settlement areas. 
Although the opportunity cost of the 
loss of this agricultural land cannot be 
precisely quantified, it remains quite 
substantial. 
Forests are a valuable source of con- 
struction poles for houses and latrines, 
firewood, medicine, thatching and 
fodder. In terms of fuelwood alone it 
has been estimated that displaced 
Mozambicans consume between 
54,000 MT and 74,000 MT of fuelwood 
annually (GOM 1992). 
The frequent use of heavy trucks 
transporting food relief to the refugee 
areas continues to degrade roads. 
While some of the cost of maintenance 
is borne by UNHCR, the biggest por- 
tion is borne by the Malawi Govern- 
ment. For instance in 1989190, the total 
expenditure by the Roads Department 
was US$4.2 million. The UNHCR con- 
tributed US$ 1.2 million with the rest 
being borne by the Government of 
Malawi (GOM 1992:27). 
Strain on Resources and Revenues 
The presence of large numbers of refu- 
gees in Malawi has placed an enor- 
mous strain on the country's economy. 
In terms of manpower, it has already 
been pointed out that the administra- 
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tion of the relief program has been in- 
tegrated into the existing government 
structure. This implies that all govern- 
ment departments and ministries in- 
volved-the Office of the President 
and Cabinet, district administration, 
health, education, women, children 
and community services, works, agri- 
culture, and forestry-have to some- 
how double their workload with the 
same amount of human resources. 
A lot of time and effort by both head- 
quarters and district level officials are 
spent planning and implementing 
refugee-related programs. Financially, 
the cost of allowances, vehicle mainte- 
nance and staff salaries in allministries 
is a significant expense to the 
Malawian state. Although partially fi- 
nanced by the UNHCR, a sector ex- 
penditure sheet on displaced persons 
for 1990 alone showed a net total addi- 
tional cost to the Malawi Government 
of US$25.1 million (GOM 1992). 
It is estimated that 60 to 70 percent 
of patients in district hospitals are refu- 
gees, resulting in a heavy burden on 
the personnel and facilities. The direct 
and indirect costs of hosting the refu- 
gees, i.e., pressure on public goods and 
services, has far-reaching conse- 
quences for the country. A joint Gov- 
ernment of Malawi, World Bank, 
UNDP and UNHCR report (1990) 
found that: 
The influx of Mozambican refugees 
into Malawi in 1987-90 has created 
significant stress on the economy 
and is beginning to undermine the 
country's development program and 
structural adjustment initiatives. 
This impact is not peculiar to Ma- 
lawi. In fact, the impact of the Mozam- 
bican war on the rest of the southern 
African countries is even more alarm- 
ing. The Commonwealth estimates 
that the total economic cost of 
destabilisation to the front-line states 
is in excess of US $45 billion-more 
than double their external debt. 
Strained Malawi-Mozambique 
Relations 
Since hosting the refugees, Malawi has 
had increasingly poor relations with 
Mozambique, fuelled by numerous al- 
legations by the Mozambican Govern- 
ment. For instance, Malawi was ac- 
cused of swelling its coffers with 
international aid by discouraging 
thousands of Mozambican refugees 
from returning home; and also, that 
the Government of Malawi exagger- 
ates the number of Mozambican refu- 
gees in order to persuade the 
international community to provide 
more money.' The Government of 
Malawi has consistently refuted such 
allegations. 
Decreased National Security and 
Rising Security Costs 
Over the past five to ten years, Malawi 
has experienced decreased security as 
criminal and military elements have 
brought AK-47s into the country. As 
the UNHCR Deputy Representative in 
Malawi lamented: 
Unfortunately there have been sev- 
eral incidents over the past four or 
five months resulting in both 
Mozambican and Malawian casual- 
ties ... these attacks, as far as we can 
tell, are part of the escalation of the 
war across the border. 
Of late, gunmen have shot dead busi- 
nessmen in Ntcheu (1992), killed four 
in Ntcheu/Dedza, and robbed the Na- 
tional Bank in Blantyre and other or- 
ganization~.~ The consequences of 
these activities have been inaeased in- 
security, psychological torture to the 
Malawian people in the border areas, 
and heavy costs in terms of police in- 
vestigations and inaeased patrols. 
Loss of Autonomy 
The refugee situation places a host 
country in a situation in which it has to 
surrender some of its autonomy in ac- 
cordance with international stand- 
ards. For instance, would Malawi 
enact a Refugee Act without the 
present refugee crisis in the country? 
Furthermore, the operation of the hu- 
manitarian assistance program may 
conflict with national development 
priorities. A lot of actors and interests 
are involved in decision-making, from 
the highest national Joint Operations 
Committee, down to the District Joint 
Operations Committee and the Camp 
Management Committee. As a result, 
the actual implementation of refugee 
policy may not mirror the exact nature 
of national development policies and 
priorities. To what extent, for example, 
does the sacrifice the District Commis- 
sioner makes in terms of time and ef- 
fort to attend to refugee related issues, 
such as the planning of African Refu- 
gee Day, among others, reflect the offi- 
cial priorities, needs and requirements 
of the host nation? Scarce human re- 
sources'have to be delegated to such 
activities to appease the international 
donor community, at the expense of 
more important responsibilities. 
Another example of lost autonomy 
came from the local population who 
gave up large portions of their land for 
the siting of refugee camps. They re- 
main uncompensated and do not have 
access to relief programs. Mere sacri- 
fice and their precarious situation is 
not a sufficient index of suffering. Un- 
fortunately, the legal determination of 
refugee status is irrelevant to local vil- 
lagers who only see a reallocation of 
national and international resources to 
a foreign population. Feeding a refu- 
gee population, when up to 55 percent 
of the local population is malnour- 
ished, would not seem to reflect the 
interests of the host nation. 
Perhaps, these contradictions could 
best be explained in terms of imposed 
policy agendas. As Bach (1988) ob- 
served, inequality in the international 
order makes African host states inca- 
pable of being autonomous in formu- 
lating refugee policies. In order to gain 
access to international development 
and relief funds, the Malawi Govern- 
ment has had to sacrifice services and 
funds that were previously allocated 
to its own population. 
Conclusion 
This paper examined some of the 
socio-economic and political impacts 
of refugees in a host country with par- 
ticular reference to Mozambican 
refugees in Malawi. The major thrust 
of the paper was that the costs of host- 
ing a refugee population-for small, 
economically undeveloped counties 
like Malawi-far outweigh the 
6 Vnl 1% Nn 6 Int-tnhor 10011 
